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I. MICROSCOPES AND TELESCOPES
"Mr. Justice Brandeis is . . .the master of both the micro-
scope and the telescope."" So Charles Evans Hughes sought to ex-
plain Brandeis's greatness as a lawyer. The power of Hughes's ob-
servation lies in its recognition of the range of tasks that lawyers
are required to perform in order to serve the interests of their cli-
ents and those of society at large. On the one hand, every lawyer
must be in control of the particular facts of a given case: concepts
without precepts are indeed empty. On the other, every lawyer
must have an eye on the theoretical structures that make the facts
relevant: precepts without underlying concepts are indeed blind.
Good legal analysis turns on the ability to marry the in-depth un-
derstanding of the particular case to the overall structure of the
system.
The aphorism about Brandeis does not apply only to lawyers
who practice within the system. It also should influence the style of
legal scholarship. By and large academic lawyers are in the busi-
ness of generating theories that have greater explanatory power
than their rivals. Concepts are our business. In some cases the ef-
fort is positive, to describe the law as it is; in others the effort is
normative, to describe the law as it should be. In practice, of
course, the lines between the positive and normative blur precisely
because no one finds it easy to defend a normative theory that
judges and lawyers have uniformly rejected in practice.2
This urge to do general theoretical work, both positive and
normative, has led to a distinct preference for the telescope over
the microscope. Most modern legal theory is system building that
seeks to locate the dominant features of legal rules in comprehen-
t James Parker Hall Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. The author thanks
the members of the Osgoode Hall Law School Workshop for their useful comments on an
earlier draft, and Eric Webber for his valuable research assistance.
I Charles Evans Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Felix Frankfurter, ed., Mr. Justice
Brandeis 3 (1932).
1 See Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Normative Elements of Legal Education, 8
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 255, 256 (1985).
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sive, if not formal, models of economic thought or political theory.
This recent move toward constructing wide-ranging theories repre-
sents a significant departure from the traditional mode of tort
scholarship, which directed its attention to analyzing and resolving
marginal cases that did not fit easily within conventional doctrines.
The traditional theory of proximate causation, for example, first
assumed that it was self-evident that a person was responsible only
for the harm he had caused,3 and then asked how that insight car-
ried over to hard cases where acts of God or the deliberate actions
of third persons intervened between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's injury. The larger question-why there should be a
causation requirement at all-was never explicitly addressed. Simi-
larly, the traditional analysis of negligence assumed that "fault"
was essential to liability and then asked the marginal questions:
for example, was the anxious or inexperienced driver truly negli-
gent or did his conduct show reasonable care, if pardonable
inadvertence?
Today, on the other hand, legal scholarship primarily-and
rightly-focuses on foundational issues. Both corrective justice and
consequentialist theories seek to identify some central theorem to
unify not only separate rules within a given branch of law but,
more ambitiously, entire branches of law with each other.
In its quest for comprehensive legal theories, however, con-
temporary legal scholarship often neglects the necessary linkages
between the telescope and the microscope. Theories of corrective
justice, for example, often make very strong assumptions about the
practical nature and the operation of the legal system.4 They tend,
if only implicitly, to ignore the costs of litigation, both upon the
parties and upon the courts, and they assume that the error rate in
I The opening words of the second edition of Gregory and Kalven read:
It is elementary policy that a defendant should not be held liable for the harm the
plaintiff complains of unless the plaintiff can at least show that the defendant in fact
caused the harm. The problem of connecting the defendant up with the harm is thus
an approximate starting point for the study of tort law.
Charles Gregory and Harry Kalven, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts 5 (2d ed.
1969).
" This is certainly the flavor of much of my own earlier writing, see Richard A. Epstein,
A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 203 (1973) ("[I]t is better to see the law of
torts in terms of what might be called its political function. The arguments made here sug-
gest that the first task of the law of torts is to define the boundaries of individual liberty."),
but less of my more recent writing, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law Corrective Jus-
tice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 74-102 (1979); Richard A. Epstein,
The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Torts, 13 J. Legal Stud. 475, 506 (1984). For a
criticism of my theory of causation, see John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J.
Legal Stud. 419 (1979).
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litigation is not only low, but unaffected by the choice of legal rule.
In essence there is a often a temptation to translate a moral imper-
ative into a legal norm, without fully addressing the question of
whether the magnitude of the moral concern is large enough to
warrant invoking the coercive power of the state.
The same type of naive assumptions can be found in economic
inquiries that begin with the fountainhead of modern law and eco-
nomics, the Coase theorem. 5 The first part of the theorem states
that in a world without transaction costs, the allocation of re-
sources will not be dependent upon original assignment of rights. If
rights are properly allocated, they will stay put. If they are not,
then by a (never-ending) series of (costless) transactions they will
gravitate to their highest value use. The second part of theorem is
far messier and in practice far more important.' It says that where
transaction costs are positive, rights once assigned by the state
may not be reassignable in practice by private parties, as the gains
from any reassignment of rights may be less than the private costs
of bringing that reassignment about. Because of the costs of reas-
signment, the rule of liability really does matter: initial assign-
ments have a tendency to persist even after their usefulness is out-
lived. One central task of the legal system is therefore to develop a
set of rules and institutions that minimize the sum of the transac-
tion costs, if only to facilitate voluntary transactions.
Transaction costs also play a vital role in particular disputes
that arise under the rules that the legal system, rightly or wrongly,
has chosen to enforce. Coase originally illustrated his theorem with
cases drawn from the law of torts, specifically nuisance, and it is
tort theory that still provides one of the best settings in which to
examine the question of how transaction costs influence the opera-
tion of the legal system, by requiring compromises between the ba-
sic norms of the system and its discrete rules of application. Curi-
ously, the problem of transaction costs, while critical, is
understudied in the formal models, which tend to give relatively
small weight to the administrative costs of the system and far
greater weight to the incentive structures that tort rules are
designed to create.
In one notable early example, John Prather Brown formally
demonstrated that rules of negligence (with or without contribu-
tory negligence) and of strict liability (but only with contributory
negligence) both had identical, desirable incentive effects that led
s See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 2-15 (1960).
6 See id. at 15-44.
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both plaintiffs and defendants in ordinary cases to take the socially
optimal level of care.7 The formal steps of the proof have been re-
counted many times and clearly follow from the formal assump-
tions of Brown's model." All variations are elegant permutations of
one simple principle: it never pays a self-interested private party
to take more or less than the socially optimal level of care.
Brown's central conclusion remains unrefuted. In a world
where litigation is costless and reliable, all feasible systems of lia-
bility are identical in their allocative effects, and all are efficient.
Yet the implications of this argument are quite puzzling, for how
does one choose one liability rule among equals? What Brown has
shown is that on the question of incentives there is little, if any,
7John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323
(1973).
' The essence of Brown's proof is as follows: Assume that there is some socially optimal
level of care, defined as X*. Under a negligence rule, the defendant who performs below
that level of care must pay both for damages and for the expenses of care actually expended.
His private losses will decrease if he moves to care level X*, which when performed allows
him to escape damage payments. Yet by the same token, if the defendant increases the level
of care beyond X*, the additional costs incurred will exceed his savings in damage pay-
ments. To minimize his private costs, the defendant again has the incentive to return to X*,
the social optimum. Under these austere assumptions, only those accidents that are worth
preventing are prevented.
A parallel proof works under strict liability. If the defendant takes care less than X*,
then he can improve his position by moving to X*, because the cost of additional precau-
tions are less than his savings from reduced tort judgments. Similarly, if the defendant takes
more care than X*, he can make himself better off by reducing care to X*" the increased
liability will be more than offset by his savings on precautions. The social optimum, X*, is
therefore the private optimum as well.
Brown also uses these assumptions to show that it is unnecessary to regulate the plain-
tiff's conduct under a negligence system. His prior demonstration made it clear that the
defendant had the incentive to move his care level to X*, the social optimum, in order to
minimize his private costs. In this austere world, the plaintiff (even without the contributory
negligence defense) knows that there will be no possibility of recovery from a defendant
whose conduct will as a matter of course meet the appropriate standard of care. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff will move his care level to some point that minimizes his own private
costs. That point is exactly the level where the costs of additional care exceed the reduction
in accident losses associated with it, or the applicable social optimum.
With strict liability, however, a defense of contributory negligence matters very much.
Under strict liability without defenses, the plaintiff (who prima facie can always recover)
does not have the right incentives to avoid harm, so that some defense of contributory negli-
gence, based upon the plaintiff's ability to prevent costs, is necessary to prevent the plaintiff
from taking unnecessary risks at the defendant's expense.
Note that Brown's proof depends upon these very austere assumptions. Once there is
some question under a negligence system, for example, whether the defendant will be at X*,
then it is far from clear whether the plaintiff will always move to Y*, with or without con-
tributory negligence.
For one small correction to Brown's proof, see George B. Assaf, The Shape of Reaction
Functions and the Efficiency of Liability Rules: A Correction, 13 J. Legal Stud. 101 (1984)
(correcting errors in the derivation of reaction functions used by Brown).
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basis for choosing among the plausible liability rules that judges
have fashioned with their far less systematic inquiries. To be sure,
his proof rules out other hypothetical rules of tort liability that are
wildly inferior to either negligence or strict liability rules, with or
without contributory negligence. 9 A concern with incentives, for
example, is quite sufficient to block a rule of tort liability that re-
quires the victim to compensate the aggressor, or a third party to
pay for the losses created by the defendant. The divergence be-
tween private gain and social loss is so obvious in both cases that
courts shied away from these results on intuitive grounds long
before economic analysis was a wisp on the academic horizon.
Nonetheless, these incentive arguments do not tell us much
about how to choose among the dominant common law tort rules.
What does? Brown's approach is of little help in answering this
question. While incentive arguments serve as an original screen for
disposing of inferior rules, selection among the survivors depends
on how each rule responds to other types of practical problems and
costs. 10 The only plausible method for choosing among the compet-
ing common law liability rules is to choose according to how satis-
factorily they answer the second-order questions that are systemat-
ically ruled out by the austere assumptions of Brown's model.1'
That Brown's assumptions are austere can hardly be disputed.
For example, in his model there will be personal injuries, but there
never will be a case of actionable negligence by any party, for all
possible defendants will move toward the optimum level of care to
escape liability. Hence successful tort actions should take place
only under strict liability rules. This does not square with everyday
experience: ordinary human negligence under a negligence system
is commonplace. This is in part because no person functions at 100
percent efficiency, and in part because there can be genuine uncer-
I It is for the reasons articulated by Brown that the choice between negligence and
strict liability does not have the broad social consequences, good or bad, that have been
attributed to it. See Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 1717, 1723-40 (1982). It would be a vast mistake, though, to assume that
the world is similarly impervious to any imaginable choice of common law rules. A rule that
makes victims pay aggressors would clearly be perverse, as would a contract rule that says
any party who breaches a contract is entitled to recover damages from the innocent party.
'6 This theme is developed in Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for
Benefit?, 13 J. Legal Stud. 57, 62-80 (1984).
11 One approach, of course, is to assume that these second order problems and, accord-
ingly, the choice of liability rule really do not much matter: either rule within Brown's set
will do as well as the other. See generally Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability
Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud. 13 (1972). Examining the costs that vary significantly according to
the choice of liability rules reveals the weakness of Demsetz's position.
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tainty about the optimum level of care and whether the defendant
has complied with it. Then, too, there are many reasons why not
all injured plaintiffs bring suit. A defendant may be insolvent or
beyond jurisdiction, or the costs of litigation may exceed the
amount to be recovered.12
The substantial role of these frictions in real-world disputes is
evident enough to judges, lawyers, and clients alike. Indeed, it is
the thesis of this article that within the class of rules that appear
plausible on incentive and corrective justice grounds, administra-
tive and error costs routinely should play a dominant role in the
shaping of legal rules, not only of evidence and procedure, but also
of substantive tort law. The telescope does not show us all the
proper answers; for those we must look to the microscope.
The enterprise of figuring out how these costs influence the
substantive shape of the law is of potentially enormous scope, cov-
ering virtually the entire body of tort law. To give only one exam-
ple, reluctance to compensate victims for mental distress or for
pure economic harms attributable to negligence stems in large part
from the judicial fear that a system with such extensive protection
is clearly unworkable. 13 In addition, much of the law of nuisance,
such as the doctrine of "live and let live," can be explained in part
by the simple idea that the costs of suit are too great for everyday
low-level reciprocal nuisances.14 Similarly, the decline of the law of
nuisance and the rise of public intervention in environmental mat-
ters have followed largely from a conviction that private suits are
simply too expensive to control the manifest types of external
harm, when the number of possible defendants is great, the costs
of their identification are high, and apportionment of loss among
them is uncertain.
This article, however, does not range so widely. Instead, it ad-
12 For a discussion of the trade-offs between tort damages and regulation, see Steven
Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984).
13 See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927). For more mod-
ern statements, see State of La. ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("Denying recovery for pure economic losses is a pragmatic limitation on the
doctrine of forseeability, a limitation we find both workable and useful."); Barber Lines A/S
v. MN Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1985) ("These considerations, of adminis-
trability and disproportionality, offer plausible, though highly abstract, 'policy' support for
the reluctance of the courts to impose tort liability for purely financial harm.").
14 See Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 66, 83-84, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (1862); Epstein,
8 J. Legal Stud. at 87-89 (cited in note 4). Robert Ellickson's article, Of Coase, Cattle and
Cooperation: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623
(1986), indicates that the legal system is rarely resorted to in cattle trespass cases in the
rural areas of Shasta County, where again the norms of reciprocity, expressed in "live and
let live" terms, tend to dominate.
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dresses the question of how transaction costs can and should shape
legal rules within the routine, mainline business of common law
courts: the ordinary actions for property damages and physical in-
juries. To focus the inquiry even further, I shall concentrate on one
pervasive element of all legal disputes that bears heavily on the
costs of running a legal system: time.
II. TIME AND LEGAL SYSTEMS
Time is an inevitable dimension to all tort actions, if only be-
cause of the prosaic observation that the actions or events that
cause a harm must precede the harm itself. The direction of causa-
tion is only one part of the total picture, though, and for our pur-
poses it is the less important one. The length of the interval be-
tween cause and effect-or more generally the length of the
interval between the constellation of facts that generate tort liabil-
ity and the liability itself-is critical to the operation .of the sys-
tem.15 With the passage of time, the evidence available regarding a
given legal issue necessarily becomes stale. The reliability of any
determination thus decreases, and with it the effectiveness of the
system no matter its objectives. If factual determinations are less
than 100 percent reliable, there is a loss in making social objectives
operational, whether the objective is compensation or deterrence,
liberty or efficiency. The signal is weakened by the noise in
transmission.
The rate of decay in the signal has profound implications for
the integrity of the legal system. When the signal goes wrong, the
effectiveness of the system-that is, the extent to which it im-
proves on a system of purely random decisions-is reduced to the
difference between the number of right and wrong decisions. If the
signal has a 10 percent error, then the effectiveness of the rules is
reduced substantially, by a first approximation to 80 percent: 90
percent correct, less 10 percent wrong. If the factual determina-
tions are only 50 percent correct, then there is no reason for the
rule at all, because the effect upon primary conduct is at best ran-
dom, as 50 less 50 is zero. If the determinations of the system are
always wrong, then it is tantamount to having the opposite rule
with perfect reliability, as 0-100=-100. Stated generally, the
"reliability rate" equals 1 - 2e, where "e" is the rate of error im-
" I have developed the point in a parallel paper on the role of time in property law.
See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property,
64 Wash. U. L. Q. 662 (forthcoming 1986).
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plicit in the determination. The reliability of the system thus de-
clines by a twofold multiple of the error rate.16
Similar arguments can be made about the expenses of litiga-
tion. If rules were costless, it would always pay to use the ideal
rule. But rules have costs, and there is little reason to adopt a rule
that costs $100 to resolve a $50 dispute-at least where the moneys
are invested in deciding whether the facts of a particular case con-
form to the rule. Although there may be a long-term social asset
created by the choice of the optimal rule to govern a set of ;similar
cases (and, correspondingly, multiplied costs from choosing the
wrong rule), there is no such capital asset created by the right reso-
lution of a particular factual issue.1" The expenses of fact determi-
nation recur with each individual case.
The passage of time is positively correlated with both of the
costs just identified: the expense of litigation and the error rate.
The longer the period between operative fact and legal judgment,
the more likely it is that error will creep in: memories will fade,
evidence will disappear or become unreliable. Uncertain outcomes
are costly in that they necessarily make risk-averse persons-that
is, most of us-worse off. Uncertain outcomes also increase the
stakes in litigation, so that more will have to be expended before
judgment or settlement is reached.
These features of litigation are perfectly general, and they lead
to one conclusion: other things being equal, a legal system that
compresses the scope of the temporal dimension will operate at a
higher degree of effectiveness than one that fails to respond to
temporal demands.
As a first approximation, it might be said that any concerns
with the temporal dimension could be taken fully into account by
either the statute of limitation or the general law of evidence. Stat-
utes of limitation, typically running from the date of injury, are
the most'simple and obvious way to cope with the problem. It is
true that pure tort theory offers no reason why the mere passage of
18 This formulation is perhaps most easily understood intuitively as the percentage im-
provement over a system of purely random decisions. By definition, a system of random
decisions reaches the correct result 50 percent of the time, assuming simple two-party cases.
A system 90 percent accurate increases the percentage of correct decisions by 40 percentage
points, that is, by 80 percent over the 50 percent accuracy of the random syster.
17 1 put aside for now the questions of fact that prove relevant to future litigation be-
tween the same or related parties. The function of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to
preserve those capital values, at least where it can be done without undermining the sound-
ness of the original litigation.
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time should alter the relationships between two individuals. 8 In
and of itself, the passage of time does not constitute a waiver of a
cause of action, which in all cases requires a deliberate release of a
known right; nor is evidence in old cases necessarily stale.
Yet every legal system has to play the odds. The passage of
time is correlated with a wide variety of factors, each of which
makes it less likely that a lawsuit will reach the correct outcome.
The insistence upon a statute of limitation recognizes that some-
times better overall results are reached by not making individual-
ized inquiries into the facts of each case. In the end no manipula-
tion of the burdens of proof, the rules of admissibility, or the
discretion of the jury works as well or efficiently as a simple rule
that forces a plaintiff to sue early in the process or forever hold his
peace. Statutes of limitation elevate the temporal element to a cat-
egorical role.
To be sure, a statute of limitation rarely is totally determina-
tive; there may be an exceptional event, such as the delayed dis-
covery of injury,19 that might toll the statute's operation. Yet the
exceptions usually are constructed so that only a small fraction of
cases will fall within them, and these cases in turn are often sub-
ject to an explicit limitation period, as with statutes of limitation
that resume running in full force from the date of discovery. At
some point the pursuit of individual justice becomes too costly to
maintain case by case.
The statute of limitation is only the most obvious illustration
of the way temporal pressures skew legal outcomes. Many doc-
trines of substantive law also seek to respond to the temporal di-
mension, even in cases not disposed of by the statute of limitation.
1, I develop this point, and the case for statutes of limitation generally, more fully in
Epstein, 64 Wash. U. L. Q. at 662 (cited in note 15).
19 One modern exception to the point has to do with those cases in which the injury
itself in some sense occurs before its discovery. Here one possible escape from the dilemma
is to hold, in a manner wholly consistent with ordinary usage, that injury and its manifesta-
tion mean the same thing. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949). Another ap-
proach is to toll the statute of limitation until the date of discovery of the injury. That
approach responds to the obvious point that no plaintiff can act upon rights of which he is
essentially ignorant. Yet the indefinite tolling creates serious problems because of the decay
of evidence and the costs of additional suits. Moreover, if the typical statute of limitation
runs between one and three years, the tolling provision could extend its operation twenty or
more years. There is, I think, something to be said for a two-tiered statute of limitation that
adds a fixed number of years for discovery, and then imposes an absolute ban on a cause of
action, whether or not discovery has occurred. For a discussion in the related context of
outside statutes of limitation, see section HI-F, below, and notes 71-96 and accompanying
text. For an examination of the use of two-tiered statutes in adverse possession cases, see
Epstein, 64 Wash. U. L. Q. at 662 (cited in note 15).
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The classical common law tort rules had a keen sense of the perva-
sive need for tight temporal connections. On the other hand, many
modern tort doctrines have been the source of great difficulty pre-
cisely because they have underestimated the importance of time in
generating appropriate legal rules.
In this article I examine a number of doctrinal choices that
contain within them an implicit choice of the proper temporal di-
mension. The discussion begins with a number of substantive doc-
trines: proximate causation, the choice between negligence and
strict liability as the proper standard of liability, the doctrines of
contributory negligence and last clear chance, the rise of vicarious
liability, the privity limitation of the classical common law, and the
"open and obvious" defense. It then turns to the use of statutory
and administrative standards for measuring the appropriate stan-
dard of care, and finally it examines the place of outside statutes of
limitation.
I do not suggest these rules are shaped solely in response to
the temporal dimension. Each of these doctrines responds to a
wide range of pressures, so that its study is necessarily incomplete
when the dominant focus is placed upon the temporal element.
Nonetheless, it is useful to isolate a single thread that runs
through many different doctrines and illuminates a wide range of
institutional issues. Studying the particular legal responses to the
pressures created by the passage of time is one useful way to con-
nect, as Brandeis did, the telescope to the microscope.
III. TIME IN TORT DocTRmNEs
A. Proximate Causation
One obvious place in which the temporal dimension has ex-
erted a heavy influence on tort doctrine is in the law of proximate
causation. The literal meaning of the phrase "proximate cause" is
the "nearest cause," that is, nearest in both time and space. While
speculations about "but for" causation often have tempted philo-
sophical analysts to find the causes of individual harm in the re-
mote origins of the universe, the more sober common law judges
(and their Roman and civil law counterparts) have in practice
started their analysis of the great chain of causation from the op-
posite end. They have begun with the injury itself and worked
grudgingly backwards by small, discrete steps to the causally re-
sponsible conduct of other persons.
This pattern of analysis was evident in the Roman law of tort,
as it developed in the Lex Aquilia, the general Roman statute for
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damages inflicted upon killing a slave or draught animal.20 The
core idea of causation was killing corpore corpori, or "by the body
to the body." From that narrow definition of killing, the rules of
liability expanded to cover other cases. The smallness of the steps
can surprise the modern reader. Thus the Romans thought it nec-
essary to mention that an action could be brought for killing where
the deadly blow was struck with a sword or a stick held in the
hand.21 Still a further extension of liability arose when A pushed B
into C, for then a third person, whose possible conduct raised
harder issues of causal intervention, stood between the plaintiff
and the defendant.22
More generally, the Romans recognized that actions against a
wrongdoer could not be limited to cases that involved the use of
force. Thus they developed-in a striking parallel to the English
action on the case-the actio in factum, which lay not for "kill-
ing," but for "furnishing a cause of death. '23 This secondary theory
of liability was of great importance, for it covered the case of the
man who gave poison instead of medicine for another to drink. The
intervening act of the victim-ingesting the poison-took the case
outside the narrow confines of the use of force. Yet the ignorance
with which the poison was drunk meant that the victim's act was
not performed voluntarily in anticipation of its consequences: thus
the causal connection between the druggist's mistake and the vic-
tim's injury was not severed.
Although the Roman theories of causation show a willingness
20 See Dig. IX, 2, reproduced in full in F. H. Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law 80-
137 (1950).
21 Dig. IX, 2, 7, 1, reproduced in Lawson, Negligence at 85 (cited in note 20).
" Dig. IX, 2, 7, 3, reproduced in Lawson, Negligence at 85 ("Hence if a man does dam-
age through being pushed by another, Proculus writes that neither is the one who pushed
liable, because he did not kill, nor the one who was pushed, because he did not do the
damage unlawfully: and on this view an action in factum must be given against the one who
pushed.").
There are several nice points to note about this passage. First, it is not clear why a
direct action on the statute would not lie against the pusher, given that the person pushed
was an instrument, like the sword. Here the best explanation seems to be that persons may
well act, and hence intervene, whereas instruments, which must be passive, cannot. Second,
the denial of the action against the party pushed is for the wrong reason. The text says that
he did not act unlawfully, and hence makes the case turn on the want of dolus or culpa, of
wrongful intention or negligence. As such, the case by implication rejects the strict liability
position. Yet no liability is still the right result under strict liability because of the non actio
defense, of the sort relevant in early English cases, discussed below at notes 24-28 and ac-
companying text. Third, the actio in factum gets the right person, by calling this a case of
indirect harm, even though the harm is in fact direct. The parallel to the action on the case
should be evident. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text below.
2U Lawson, Negligence at 23 (cited in note 20).
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to run backwards, they never predicated liability upon long or
complex chains of causation. Roman commentary spent virtually
all of its effort developing the line between "killing" and "furnish-
ing a cause of death," without ever probing by example or system-
atic inquiry the outer limits of causation. The problems with the
temporal dimension thus were effectively curtailed by the narrow
substantive scope given to proximate causation before it became a
serious issue.
The early common law shows a similar reliance upon very
tight theories of causation. The "proximate" in proximate causa-
tion typically received a practical construction echoing its literal
meaning: only the nearest cause counted. Gilbert v. Stone24 illus-
trates how unyielding that rule was. The defendant was chased by
a band of twelve armed men onto the plaintiff's land, whereupon
he took the plaintiff's gelding. The defendant's plea of necessity
was rejected: "This is no plea to justifie the defendant; for I may
not do a trespasse to one for fear of threatenings of another, for by
this means the party injured shall have no satisfaction, for he can-
not have it of the party that threatened."25 Implicit in the last
clause is an account of proximate causation that treats the coercion
imposed upon an immediate trespasser as too remote. The third
party cannot be sued in trespass: he did not enter the land, the
defendant did. But the statement in Gilbert also appears to pre-
clude all relief against the twelve attackers, including an action on
the case for indirect harm.
As a matter of theory, Gilbert seems both correct and incor-
rect.2" It is correct to allow the action against the immediate tres-
passer, for it is not the plaintiff's affair that the defendant was
coerced into entering his land by a third party. But it does not
follow that the third party's actions are remote from the harm so
that he should not be liable. Coercing the intermediate is in princi-
ple a different act, but it is an act that extends and does not break
the chain of causation.
The conclusion that coerced intermediate action does not
break the chain of causation is reinforced by the standard premise
of liberal (or at least libertarian) theory: no person is allowed to
use force or fraud against the person or property of another. The
libertarian principle is capable of accounting for not only immedi-
ate trespasses but also more complex causal chains. One starts with
21 Style 72, 82 Eng. Rep. 539 (K.B. 1647).
25 Id.
26 As are the Roman parallels. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text above.
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the harm and works backwards to all actions in the chain of
human and natural connections. Where the original actor's conduct
was constrained by the force or fraud of another person, then it is
proper to trace that conduct to the force or fraud. In contrast,
where neither force nor fraud is present, the conduct of the origi-
nal party is a "free and independent action," and inquiry into
more remote causes should cease. 7
In Gilbert, the chain contains two actions and three persons;
but the force used against the trespasser is obvious and sufficiently
close to give rise to liability. The plaintiff should have the choice of
suit against either the immediate trespasser or the parties Who
drove him to take the gelding. In any event, the trespasser, if
forced to pay damages, should be allowed to pursue actions over
against the band of attackers, if he can find them. The basic prin-
ciple is that any person in the chain can sue those persons prior in
time in the chain, while being exposed to suit by any person later
in the chain. In the end the loss should settle on the original actor,
unless some special defense intervenes. In practice, it is highly un-
likely that the requisite constraints will be found in fact to bind
more than one or two actors, although Scott v. Shepherd,28 with its
infamous squib, involved a chain of four persons and three acts.
Thus, even in its restricted version, the theory of proximate
cause tends to drive us back to the original cause much in the same
way that the doctrine of first possession drives us to the original
root of title.29 But the tension persists between the theoretical
search for proximate cause and the practical demands of proof.
The further one goes back in time to find causal connections, the
less reliable the evidence. The issue then is how to strike a balance.
Where the temporal connections are short, the question is not of
great moment; and therefore it is a great benefit of focusing on
force and fraud that such a focus tends to keep the chains short
(even after the abolition of the forms of action).
Thus, for example, many nineteenth century cases, especially
those of English vintage, adopted the "last wrongdoer" account of
proximate cause in an effort to avoid the practical difficulties of
long causal chains.30 Even that doctrine contained a good deal of
"7 I have argued the point extensively. See Epstein, 2 J. Legal Stud. at 174-77 (cited in
note 4). The case here falls under the paradigm "A compelled B to hit C."
28 2 Wm. BI. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773). Note that Gilbert v. Stone was not a tres-
pass case according to the "immediate entry" test advocated (rightly) by Blackstone in his
dissenting opinion in Scott v. Shepherd.
" For extensive discussion, see Epstein, 64 Wash. U. L. Q. at 662 (cited in note 15).
so For elaboration of the "last wrongdoer" rule, see Thomas Beven, 1 Negligence in
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refinement, due to the systematic effort to reduce the causal signif-
icance of intermediate actors who were insolvent, such as infants
and insane persons. There, the dominant sentiment was often to
deny the "responsibility" of these actors in order to reach some
more financially responsible party further back in the chain of cau-
sation. Even after the "last wrongdoer" limitation collapsed in
both England and the United States, the remaining doctrines of
proximate cause still constrained the temporal dimension of the
ordinary tort case. Successive wrongful actions by two independent
defendants usually took place within a relatively narrow compass
of time, far shorter, for example, than the applicable statute of
limitation. There were occasional hard cases within the system,31
but none that posed a fundamental challenge to its continued op-
eration, no matter how much they delighted law professors.
B. Negligence and Strict Liability
The temporal dimension of tort law also influences the choice
of liability rule for accidental harms. The question is, does negli-
gence or strict liability tend to lead to shorter causal chains?
This issue was of some historical importance, as Holmes in
The Common Law rested much of the case for a negligence test
(one based upon the principle of reasonable foresight) on the
ground that it prevented the indefinite extension of causal chains
that seemingly was inevitable under a rigorous strict liability re-
gime. Drawing heavily upon the influential opinion of Justice Doe
in Brown v. Collins,32 Holmes first argued that the abolition of the
forms of action made it imperative to develop a unified theory of
liability encompassing both direct and indirect harms. Unification
in turn required an explicit choice between the dominant negli-
gence principle under case and the apparent strict liability princi-
ple in trespass. Holmes sought to establish the dominance of negli-
gence by showing the absurdity of strict liability. The gist of his
argument is contained in the following passages:
Now I repeat, that, if principle requires us to chaige a man in
trespass when his act has brought force to bear on another
through a comparatively short train of intervening causes, in
spite of his having used all possible care, it requires the same
liability, however numerous and unexpected the events be-
Law 53 (3d ed. 1908).
3, See notes 72-74 and accompanying text below for the construction cases.
32 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
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tween the act and the result. If running a man down is a tres-
pass when the accident can be referred to the rider's act of
spurring, why is it not a tort in every case, as was argued in
Vincent v. Stinehour [7 Vt. 62 (1835)], seeing that it-can al-
ways be referred more remotely to his act of mounting and
taking the horse out? ... "No case or principle can be found,
or if found can be maintained, subjecting an individual to lia-
bility for an act done without fault on his part .... All the
cases concede that an injury arising from inevitable accident,
or, which in law or reason is the same thing, from an act that
ordinary human care and foresight are unable to guard
against, is but the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays no
foundation for legal responsibility." [Harvey v. Dunlop [1843]
Hill & Den. 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).] If this were not so, any act
would be sufficient, however remote, which set in motion or
opened the door for a series of physical sequences ending in
damage; such as riding the horse, in the case of the runaway,
or even coming to a place where one is seized with a fit and
strikes the plaintiff in an unconscious spasm. Nay, why need
the defendant have acted at all, and why is it not enough that
his existence has been at the expense of the plaintiff?33
In truth, Holmes gets the relation between negligence and
strict liability backwards. He goes wrong by misapprehending the
underlying theory of causation in cases involving harm caused by
strangers. The logic of causation does not permit one to run back-
wards in time with the ease that Holmes thought possible. It is not
enough to speak of actions that "opened the door" to liability. If
any liberty of human action is to be maintained, then a defendant
can only be held liable if it is shown that all subsequent actions or
events in the chain were constrained by his acts of force or fraud
(whether he acted directly on the plaintiff or on intermediate par-
ties). The traditional categories, as well as a concern for freedom of
action, thus make it quite incoherent to speak of one's "existence"
as the cause of anything, or to belittle as irrelevant the nature of
acts that intervene temporally between plaintiff and defendant.
Once causation in stranger cases is so understood, it can be
shown why a theory of negligence creates longer causal chains,
both in time and space, than the rival theory of strict liability.
Under negligence, the simple striking of another person is just an
event whose coloration is obtained from surrounding circum-
33 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 92-95 (1881).
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stances. "He hit me" does not state a cause of action, but is treated
as though it were an act of God. Accordingly, the inquiry must
move backwards in time to find the culpable conduct that led up
to the hitting: did the defendant act reasonably in preparing him-
self for the actions so undertaken? The rider of a horse is no longer
(vicariously) liable simply in virtue of knocking down the plaintiff;
everything now turns on whether it was appropriate to ride that
horse at the given speed at the chosen location, as Holmes's lan-
guage from The Common Law makes clear.
To be sure, inquiries into prior conduct are unavoidable when
the conduct of multiple parties is at stake, as in cases like Scott v.
Shepherd. There is, however, no reason to undertake any such ex-
tended inquiry when the person whose conduct led up to the injury
was the defendant himself. Stated otherwise, if A so constrained B
to hit C, one has to look at what A did to see if he is responsible.
But where A, as it were, so constrained A to hit C, then it is suffi-
cient to note that A hit C, for A cannot have the action over
against himself. The strict liability test of the earlier common law
thus eliminates many of the temporal questions that the alterna-
tive theory of negligence brings to the fore, while raising none that
a theory of negligence eliminates.
Several of the classic cases illustrate the differences in time
frame under the two theories. In Bolton v. Stone, 4 a cricket player
hit a ball that struck a woman outside the stadium. Under a theory
of strict liability, the case is simple. It is necessary only to explore
the interval between the time the ball left the bat and the time it
hit the plaintiff, during which there were no independent acts or
natural events to sever the causal connection. Even if one wants to
hold the home team responsible for the wrongs of a visiting player,
the best approach is to adopt a simple vicarious liability rule that
makes the host landowner liable to strangers for the conduct of
persons lawfully on his premises. No doctrinal innovation is re-
quired, for this rule was used from as early as 1400 in cases of
damage from fire. 5 In contrast, a negligence standard leads to sol-
emn inquiries into the placement of the cricket pitch when the
grounds were constructed some thirty-five years before, and into
the frequency with which balls were hit outside the pitch during
the previous thirty years.
To take a second example, Hammontree v. Jenner36 was a
31 [1951] A.C. 850, rev'g [1950] 1 K.B. 201.
31 Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen. IV 18, pl. 6 (1401).
36 20 Cal.App.3d 528, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1971).
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routine running-down case under a theory of strict liability. The
defendant veered off the highway, crashed through a wall and
struck the plaintiff while she was at work in her bicycle shop.
What could be easier? Yet the case became transformed under
negligence into an exhaustive inquiry into the medical treatment
that the defendant had received some fifteen years before the acci-
dent for chronic epilepsy. The shift in emphasis came from the
court's unwillingness to regard the running down of the plaintiff as
constituting a prima facie case.
The same basic point arose in Breunig v. American Family
Insurance Co. 3 7 There insanity, rather than epilepsy, was urged to
nullify the defendant's culpability when she crossed the midline on
the highway and crashed into the plaintiff, who was traveling in
the opposite direction. Under a strict liability theory, the defen-
dant's crossing the midline and hitting the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, without regard to what made the defendant cross
the road. But the case was decided under a negligence analysis.
Again, the judicial unwillingness to make immediate actions deci-
sive on the question of liability shifted the inquiry to the prior de-
cision on whether the defendant should have driven at all, which
led to an enormous waste of administrative resources-even
though the ultimate decision correctly held for the plaintiff.
Parallel arguments work in connection with plaintiff's miscon-
duct. Several early doctrines worked to limit the temporal dimen-
sion. First, under the traditional narrow view of causation, the neg-
ligence of the plaintiff could sever the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the loss, as it did under a "last wrong-
doer" rule. Second, and more generally, the theory that regarded
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery had the ef-
fect of reducing the length of the causal chains, for except in rare
cases the plaintiff's negligence occurred at or persisted until the
very instant of the accident.
Third, the major exception to the absolute bar against recov-
ery, the "last clear chance" rule, also had a temporal component
that compressed the relevant causal period into a relatively narrow
range. This doctrine, which imposed liability on the defendant who
had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident, survived the de-
mise of the "last wrongdoer" rule, because the plaintiff, in order to
invoke it, had to show more than simply that the defendant's neg-
ligence followed the plaintiff's in time. It had to be shown in addi-
37 45 Wis.2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970).
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tion that the defendant had reason to know of the particular risk
that spurred the need for additional caution. This added mental
element produced an uneasy but sensible cross between ordinary
negligence and recklessness. Once established, the doctrine acted
to sever any causal connection between the plaintiff's prior negli-
gence and his own harm. And like so many other tort doctrines, it
compressed the causal chain, this time by focusing the inquiry on
the defendant's action or inaction immediately before the accident.
Recent doctrinal developments, however, have tended to ex-
pand the temporal dimension. For example, the doctrine of com-
parative negligence, with its rejection of "last clear chance, '' 3 re-
quires a court to assess the relative culpability of all of the
defendants, including those whose negligence may have taken
place far in the past.
On balance, the older, "cleaner" liability rules place fewer de-
mands upon the operation of the system. Insofar as administrative
manageability is the predominant concern, these "clean" rules are
to be preferred over complex rules that seek to reach a perfectly
"just" result. Nonetheless, as long as cases like Bolton, Hammon-
tree, and Breunig are relatively infrequent, any expansion of liabil-
ity they create usually stays within tolerable limits of adjudication
(although they can be attacked or defended on other grounds 39).
But such expansions of liability have very different implications in
the world of vicarious, and especially products, liability.
C. Vicarious Liability
I believe that uneasiness with long chains of causation also has
contributed to the adoption at common law of a general principle
of vicarious liability. This principle, in its most common applica-
38 Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Last
clear chance had been regarded as a transitional doctrine under the old system where con-
tributory negligence had been an absolute bar. See Malcolm M. MacIntyre, The Rationale
of Last Clear Chance, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225, 1241-51 (1940).
"I See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance,
Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 65 (1981) (de-
fending the doctrine of last clear chance on the ground that it tends to give the right
marginal incentives to both the earlier and the later actors when their inputs to the accident
are sequential).
My own sense is that the incentive arguments are very unclear because neither actor in
the sequence will know the applicable legal rule or that he has acted in a setting in which
the rule itself might be applicable. The incentive arguments about last clear chance are
plausible only if both parties have a clear indication that they are dealing with a last clear
chance situation. Yet in most cases they will fear losses from other quarters, including the
risk of serious personal injury or the loss of personal property.
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tion, holds an employer strictly responsible for the torts of his em-
ployees committed within the scope of employment. The doctrine
was the target of sustained academic attack during the nineteenth
century on the ground that it made one person responsible for the
wrongs of a stranger: vicarious liability was said to be no better
than holding one person responsible for the debts of another.4
Nonetheless, the criticisms made no inroads upon the case law de-
velopment of the doctrine, but only provoked an extensive search
for rationales to support it. The enterprise was quite extensive and
produced a profusion of arguments on behalf of the principle that
have been well-summarized in Young B. Smith's impressive list of
nine: control, profit, revenge, carefulness and choice, identification,
evidence, indulgence, danger, and satisfaction. 1
The simplest explanation for the rise and tenacity of vicarious
liability, notwithstanding the critique that it violates individual
rights, is that the principle seems, for a wide variety of reasons
(including those listed by Smith), to work a Pareto superior shift"
from the basic common law position under which each person is
responsible only for his own actions. The ultimate question is
whether, when each person sums up his personal accounts, each
will be better or worse off with the doctrine in place.
The most obvious gain from a system of vicarious liability is
that imposing responsibility on employers rather than employees
generally increases the overall incentives to prevent accidents. Em-
ployees with insufficient resources to answer for serious harms will
be tempted to skimp on cost-justified accident precautions, even if
they are held legally responsible for their own misconduct. The
firm, with a larger pool of assets, has the incentive to monitor all
its workers. The benefits here can be quite substantial, especially
when (as in large products liability cases) an outsider who has suf-
40 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1891), 5 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1891). For the most sustained attack against the doctrine, see Thomas Baty, Vicari-
ous Liability (1916).
41 Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 455 (1923). The doctrine
of frolic and detour is most easily explained as an affirmative line of proof of the general
denial of agency. The doctrine of vicarious liability applies only when the employee is acting
within the scope of the employment. To show frolic and detour is to show that he is an
independent agent, acting on his own behalf. These cases thus fall on the margins of a
continuum with two clear poles. The first is where the employee is working for the em-
ployer; the second where he is off work completely.
412 One position is "Pareto superior" to another if it will improve the lot of some per-
sons in society without making any worse off as a result. The concept is named for the
Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), who first formulated it as part of his studies
of welfare economics.
1986] 1193
The University of Chicago Law Review
fered harm may have no way to identify which individual person
within a complex organization behaved wrongfully. 3 Moreover, the
gains are broadly distributed over the population at large; virtually
every person has some connection with a business or enterprise run
by others, if only through shares in a pension fund.
As befits this discussion, however, the temporal element again
offers a strong argument for the doctrine, even if the incentive ra-
tionale has received greater attention in the literature. To see the
point, think about how tort law would be structured in the absence
of vicarious liability. The pressure by plaintiffs to reach the deep
pockets of employers would be great, and this outcome could be
obtained from time to time under theories of intentional miscon-
duct or negligence. The theories of intentional wrong would stress
that a defendant employer had authorized the commission of the
wrong and hence should be liable under the strongest theories of
agency, those applicable under criminal law. In other cases the the-
ory might be extended to allow actions where the employer knew,
but turned a blind eye to, the dangerous practices of the employee.
Theories of negligence would be invoked more frequently and
doubtless would involve the selection and supervision of the em-
ployee by the employer.
Under both negligence and intentional tort analyses, the re-
fusal to follow the rule of vicarious liability invites investigation
into the remote causes of individual harm, where the critical issues
are likely to be those removed from plain view. The inquiry turns
back in time to what and when the employer knew about the em-
ployee's activities, and what he might have said to the employee to
authorize those activities. The formidable evidentiary problems
and consequent uncertainty need no elaboration.
The general doctrine of vicarious liability forestalls all these
inquiries by a rule that looks solely to the question of the scope of
employment. The focus under a vicarious liability system is on the
general scope of employment, not on questions of knowledge or au-
thorization that may have occurred far in the past.
To be sure, the basic principle is qualified by the "frolic and
detour" limitation, 4 with its borderline questions of liability. But
adopting vicarious liability with this limitation is not simply trad-
41 One advantage of the vicarious liability rule, therefore, is that, ,by ensuring recovery
for the plaintiff, it obviates the temptation to adopt a market share liability rule such as
that which found favor in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
44 See note 41 above.
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ing in one package of temporal problems for another package of
problems of equal magnitude. Frolic and detour normally involves
the conduct of the servant, not the employer; these events take
place at the time of the accident, not further back in time. More-
over, these facts generally are in public view, as for example with
accidents that take place after working hours or far from the place
where the employee's duties should have been performed. Al-
though a few borderline cases inevitably will arise, frolic and de-
tour is implausible as a defense in the overwhelming number of
tort actions against institutional defendants.
Accordingly, the vicarious liability rule can be understood in
part as a nearly conclusive presumption of causation against the
employer, a presumption that eliminates the complex case-by-case
inquiry into individual responsibility that otherwise would ensue.
The frolic and detour exception covers those few cases in which the
independence of the servant's action makes it highly unlikely that
any causal connection could be established.
The principles of vicarious liability need not apply only to
cases of employees. In the law of animals (a body of law influential
in Holmes's thinking), similar difficulties over causation and liabil-
ity can be avoided by a simple rule holding the owner vicariously
responsible for the torts of his animals, at least until they have
escaped into the wild and resumed their natural habitat.5 The al-
ternative system of personal liability requires one to investigate
the level of care and supervision by the owner prior to the moment
that the animal kicks, gores, or bites. In most instances the court
will find some way to extend some general theory of causation to
permit the plaintiff to recover. For example, in Baker v. Snell,4"
the defendant's employee (arguably acting outside the scope of em-
ployment) incited the defendant's dog to bite the plaintiff. The
employee's willful action was held not to sever the causal connec-
tion, and the defendant was held liable. An easier and more
straightforward way to reach the same result would have been to
hold the owner vicariously responsible for the bite of the animal,
with an action against the employee for contribution or indemnity
if the employee indeed had incited the dog. "You incited my dog to
bite the plaintiff" states a good cause of action for indemnity.
At first blush, it might seem that any indemnity action against
the employee will recreate the very temporal problems that the vi-
'5 Thomas Beven, The Responsibility at Common Law for the Keeping of Animals, 22
Harv. L. Rev. 465, 468-69 (1909).
46 [19081 2 K.B. 352, aff'd, [1908] 2 K.B. 825.
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carious liability rules foreclose. While that possibility cannot be
dismissed categorically, the temporal difficulties encountered in
the indemnity action should be far less severe than those in the
basic tort case. The question of the employee's exposure to indem-
nity by the employer is nearly always a matter for contractual ne-
gotiations between the two parties in which the difficulties and
benefits of such actions can be properly assessed.
As ever, however, the scope for implied terms is quite massive,
given that indemnity contracts often are not made. Even so, some
rough strokes can lend a measure of order to the field. In cases like
Baker v. Snell, for example, the case for an implied right of indem-
nification is strong because of the willful, or at least reckless, na-
ture of the servant's conduct. Not only does the intent inquiry
tend to focus on facts occurring just before the servant's wrong
took place, but in addition, whatever temporal problems exist pale
in comparison with the need to control strongly antisocial
behavior.
In contrast, temporal problems might be more acute with
cases of ordinary servant's negligence. One possible legal approach
is to assume that the servant as the primary responsible actor must
indemnify the employer, at least if the employer's liability is
wholly vicarious, once the innocent third party has been paid off.
However, the utter infrequency of employer suits for indemnity
tells a very different tale.47 The ability of the employer to obtain
comprehensive insurance for these accidents, coupled with the
other sanctions (e.g., firm discipline, docking pay) that may be
used to supervise employee misconduct, suggest that both em-
ployer and employee will benefit ex ante if liability is not shifted
back onto the employee. As an operating assumption, the practice
with large enterprises is that the indemnity action is not maintain-
able unless it is expressly preserved. As a result, the temporal
problems controlled by the doctrine of vicarious liability are not
reintroduced by a massive spate of actions for contribution and
indemnity.
Vicarious liability principles also emerge in the early fire cases,
which made the landowner strictly responsible for fires set by any
, See, e.g., Lister v. Romford Ice Co., [1957] A.C. 555, in which the House of Lords
held that such a right of indemnity did exist. The case occasioned much protest and re-
sulted in the formation of a special committee by the Ministry of Labour to consider legisla-
tion to overturn the decision. That committee decided against drafting legislation only be-
cause it concluded that insurance companies generally had agreed not to exercise their right
to indemnification. See 0. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 L.
Quart. Rev. 40, 57-58 (1966).
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person lawfully on the premises.4 8 There, too, the rule of imputa-
tion eliminated the need to examine the potentially remote causal
connections between doer and owner. As yet another example, the
general rule that holds an owner of land responsible for damages
caused by the activities of independent contractors on the prem-
ises also clearly imposes liability upon a defendant while bypassing
the causal problems raised in suits premised upon negligence in
supervision, selection, and control. The courts have been unwilling,
however, to extend this rule of vicarious liability beyond damages
on the premises, and with good reason: the independent contractor
works for so many separate parties that it is not possible to draw
tight causal connections to any one of them, except for the land-
owner. In Bolton v. Stone, the need to inquire into the poor design
of the playing field could have been obviated completely by a rule
holding the landowner strictly and vicariously liable for the actions
of persons lawfully on his premises.49
In sum, the basic intuition of vicarious liability extends be-
yond the employment context to any situation in which selection,
supervision, and control are possible and expected, but proof
thereof is difficult and uncertain. All these rules shorten the in-
quiry into causal chains and, I believe, improve the overall
strength of the legal system.
This discussion lends additional support to the thesis devel-
oped at the outset of this article: the rules of vicarious liability are
needed only in a second-best world. It is imperfection that drives
the system. If there were perfect knowledge of who did what, and
if each person could be held costlessly to answer for his wrongs in
full, then a system of individual responsibility would work as well
as any system of vicarious liability. Steven Shavell has argued that
the imperfections of the system of common law have led in many
instances to direct statutory regulation. I have made the same
argument in connection with the law of nuisance.5
48 "1 shall answer to my neighbour for him who enters my house by my leave or knowl-
edge, where he is guest to me or my servant, if he acts, or either of them acts, in such a way
with the candle or other things that my neighbour's house is burned." Beaulieu v. Finglam,
Y.B. 2 Hen. IV 18, pl. 6 (Markham, J.), translated in Beven, 1 Negligence in Law at 487
(cited in note 30).
1 [1951] A.C. 850, rev'g [1950] 1 K.B. 201, discussed above at text accompanying notes
34-35.
Shavell, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 358, 365-74 (cited in note 12).
Epstein, 8 J. Legal Stud. at 98-102 (cited in note 4).
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D. The Privity Limitation
The common law privity limitation also reflects, among other
things, the importance of the temporal dimension in the law of
products liability. The gist of the privity limitation is that an in-
jured party may sue only that person next in the chain of distribu-
tion and cannot maintain a direct action, in tort or otherwise,
against more remote suppliers. Although subject to significant ex-
ceptions, the privity limitation was of enormous importance in the
nineteenth-century law of products liability, for it insulated the
original manufacturer from potentially large exposure to liability.
There is one obvious contrast between the privity limitation
and vicarious liability: vicarious liability tends to expand liability
while privity works to contract it. Consequently, the parallel devel-
opments may seem a historical oddity, as both doctrines received
their decisive elaborations over roughly the same period, from 1840
to 1900. Nonetheless, when one considers the temporal dimension,
the two doctrines appear consistent. Both results seem to imple-
ment a single response to the pressures that the passage of time
places upon ordinary common law adjudication.
For our purposes, the important feature of the privity doctrine
was that it tended to direct legal action against the parties in pos-
session of the dangerous instrumentality at the time it caused in-
jury. The rule therefore had great importance for workplace acci-
dents, where it institutionalized the preference for employer's
liability over manufacturer's liability. 52 One obvious justification
for focusing liability on the employer is that such a focus shortens
the length of time between the tortfeasor's wrongful action and the
plaintiff's injury; it no longer is necessary or possible to look be-
hind the employer's responsibility in order to see what, if anything,
the manufacturer (or group of manufacturers) have done incor-
rectly. So stated, the privity limitation has a close affinity to the
doctrine of proximate cause, with which it on occasion has been
erroneously identified.53
The importance of the temporal dimension in the privity doc-
trine also was revealed by the doctrine's exceptions. With certain
refinements, these exceptions generally meant that liability could
be imposed without privity if the product in question was shown to
52 For a discussion of this issue, see Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and
Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 775, 806-08 (1982).
" See, e.g., Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). I
have written about this decision at length. Richard A. Epstein, Modem Products Liability
Law ch. 2 (1980).
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contain a latent defect, imminently hazardous to life or limb,
which existed in the product at the time it was placed into the
stream of commerce, and which then caused damage when in its
original condition while in ordinary use.54 These exceptions identi-
fied a class of cases where the passage of time was least likely to
impair the causal connection between the plaintiff's injury and the
defendant's wrong, or the quality of proof available to establish the
connection. To demand of a product that it have been in its origi-
nal condition when it caused the harm sued upon necessarily ex-
cludes the possibility that it was altered either by a conscious
third-party act or by ordinary wear and tear. As long as that condi-
tion holds, the passage of time is less likely to degrade the quality
of evidence, because the past is not cluttered by intervening events
whose causal significance must be evaluated on a case-by-case ba-
sis. That this point was well understood by the common law courts
is evidenced by their greater willingness to impose liability upon
manufacturers of products in sealed containers, and by their re-
peated insistence that the retailer was often a "mere conduit"
through whose hands the product passed to the ultimate
consumer.
55
Once the privity limitation is combined with its exceptions, it
amounts to a rule that fits well within the general theory of causa-
tion developed here. Cases of latent defect are cases of implicit
misrepresentation, so that traditional products liability cases are in
essence actions on the case in which the acts of intervening parties
(including the plaintiff) do not sever the causal connection, be-
cause those acts were undertaken in ignorance of the facts that
made them dangerous. Taken with its exceptions, the privity rule
looks less like an anomalous deviation from the general principles
of tort liability, and more like a sensible application of them.
E. Modern Products Liability Law
The passing of the privity limitation does not necessarily
mean that the legal system has no second tier of responses to the
temporal problem. Quite the contrary, so long as substantive rules
can respond to the temporal pressures, it becomes quite misleading
Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as An Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud.
645 (1985).
as See, for instance, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 468, 150 P.2d 436,
444 (1944) (majority opinion) ("Certainly there is greater reason to impose liability on the
manufacturer than on the retailer who is but a conduit of a product that he is not himself
able to test.").
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to characterize the law of products liability solely by the negative
observation that privity has been abandoned. One way to stress the
differences between products liability law in the two periods be-
tween, say, 1920 to 1968 and after 1968 is to show the very differ-
ent responses to the temporal question in the two periods."6
Between 1920 and 1968, privity was rejected on the ground
that it was "foreseeable" that dangerous conditions created by the
manufacturer would damage the ultimate consumer.57 The fore-
sight test championed by Holmes thus was used to expand the
length of causal connections, not to compress them. Yet the initial
passing of the privity rule did little to expand the scope of tort
liability from 1920 to 1968. What happened instead was that the
nineteenth-century exceptions to the old privity limitation were re-
cast as a general rule holding the manufacturer strictly liable for
products with latent defects that caused harm in ordinary use.
Nonetheless, before 1968 the substantive law of products liability
continued to place very sharp temporal limitations upon the scope
of liability.
Justice Traynor's famous formulation of strict liability in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. illustrates the narrow
scope of recovery that was permitted as late as 1962: "A manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the mar-
ket, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."'
The requirement of inspection for defects ensured that very little
change could take place in the law of products liability as applied
to most workplace injuries. Employers' liability may have yielded
to workers' compensation, but products liability actions by workers
against manufacturers remained rare events before 1970. Industrial
" I choose 1968 as the date because it marks the first major extensions of tort liability
beyond their traditional contours. In particular, two cases seem like clear turning points:
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), which ushered in the
crashworthiness cases, ostensibly on the basis of ordinary negligence principles; and Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), which was the first of the "duty to
warn" vaccine cases. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was to my mind a
far less important transition, given that its strict liability principles did nothing to expand
the threshold concept of "defect" that determines the size of the product liability area. See
Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law at ch. 6 (cited in note 53).
67 "Judge Sanborn says, for example, that the contractor who builds a bridge, or the
manufacturer who builds a car, cannot ordinarily foresee injury to other persons than the
owner as the probable result.. . . We take a different view. We think that injury to others is
to be foreseen not merely as a possible, but as an almost inevitable result." MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 392, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916), referring to Sanborn's
opinion from Huset, 120 F. at 867.
58 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) (emphasis added).
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equipment is subject to constant inspection, maintenance, and re-
pair, so that the conscientious application of the inspection re-
quirement precluded, for example, any liability in the long line of
punchpress cases associated with products customized to the local
shops.59 More dramatically, it is doubtful that any of the asbestos
or other toxic products liability cases, starting with Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,60 could have survived if the in-
spection and control requirements contemplated by the Greenman
formulation had retained their original vigor. Similarly, the "open
and obvious" rule of Campo v. Scofield,61 barring recovery for
plaintiffs injured by open and obvious defects, usually made any
determination of liability turn on the conditions as they existed
just before the moment of injury.
The removal of these two substantive barriers to recovery,
coupled with the decline of the "normal and proper" or "intended"
use limitations of the earlier decisions, dramatically shifted the
temporal focus of products liability cases backwards along the
causal chain. The result was an increase in the complexity and
hence the general costs of litigation, as well as increased error and
uncertainty in verdicts.
Other features of modern products liability have had the same
effect upon the temporal issues. The early development of prod-
ucts liability law centered on those defects of construction, design,
and warning that the manufacturer generally could control by rou-
tine inspections or by quality control procedures undertaken
before the product was marketed. In the cases dealing with con-
struction defects, almost any given level of product safety could be
achieved with the appropriate inputs of inspection and quality
control. Even in the early design and warning cases, firms could go
a long way to reduce liability by taking the right steps in advance
of sale. In design cases, the "intended" or "normal" use limitations
protected firms whose products could do the things that the manu-
facturers said they could do. If, as in Greenman, a firm said that a
lathe it sold could handle heavy wood, then the firm could design
away any defects that prevented the product from meeting its own
performance specifications. Parallel arguments apply in warning
cases.
5' See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1972).
,0 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
" 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 348 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976).
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The cost-benefit formulations of product defects popularized
by Professor John Wade, however, significantly transformed the
question "is this product defective?""2 The insistence that Wade's
seven factors" be balanced against one another in passing on lia-
bility has led to an indeterminacy of outcome that makes categori-
cal judgments about defects in any product difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to sustain.6 4 In addition, this approach necessarily reduces the
importance attached to prior regulatory approval of a product's de-
sign or warnings. The temporal difficulties in drug cases would be
handled rather simply had modern law adopted the position that
once the FDA approved a drug warning, liability would attach only
to the failure to use the stipulated warning.6 5 The level of compli-
ance by firms would be high if only because the sanctions imposed
for failure to follow FDA regulations would be grave: removal of
the product from the marketplace or heavy fines. Accordingly,
there would be few, if any, tort cases where the passage of time
could cloud the causal portions of the case. By adhering to the
traditional rules, the legal system could have followed the example
of land title recording statutes, a system that renders the law of
adverse possession a comparative backwater in the modern law of
real property.66 Precautions ex ante would be so pervasive that
62 See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.
J. 825, 834-37 (1973).
"' The seven factors are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product that would meet the same need and not be
as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss in setting the
price of the product or by carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 837-38 (footnote omitted).
" To give one illustration, it is an open question whether an automobile manufacturer
can obtain a summary judgment stating that its cars were not defective at common law
because they were not equipped with airbags at a time when these were not required by
statute and were not in general commercial production.
65 For one clear statement that the modern law has not adopted such a position, see
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal.3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973).
" For a discussion of this issue, see Epstein, 64 Wash. U. L. Q. at 662 (cited in note
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there would be infrequent need for litigation ex post.
The cost of not following this path is that temporal problems
loom large in modern products liability litigation. By treating gov-
ernment standards and industry practices only as evidence (even
prima facie evidence) of a safe product, the modern law has effec-
tively transformed the operation of the system. Both firms and
consumers may desire some device to establish a safe harbor ex
ante for their products, but it has become impossible to provide
them with one. Without some clear rule, the dam has burst. The
allocation of burdens of proof and other such trial devices raise
strictly second-order questions.
What matters in the modern products liability case is that a
jury (whose discretion, de jure and de facto, is broad) may rou-
tinely disapprove of the warning given or the design adopted. The
jury need not rewrite the warning or redesign the product. No one
can say with confidence what warning or design would be sufficient
unto the day to ward 'off liability. Admittedly therefore, if an ex
ante approach such as government certification of products is
tried, it is sure to have significant failures. But these failures usu-
ally will be common-mode failures with mass-produced or generic
products. As a result, when litigation strikes, be it with DES, as-
bestos, Agent Orange, or the Dalkon Shield (the strongest case for
liability among the recent mass torts67), the entire product line is
engulfed, not just a single unit.
On the other hand, giving so much discretion to the jury (as
the current system does) puts the brunt of the burden on the sec-
ond tier of legal responses to temporal problems. In the context of
modern products liability law, this second tier has proved sadly
unfit for the task-a failure manifest in the largely unsuccessful
search for appropriate standards for liability. In mass tort cases,
finding the appropriate ex post standard for liability is tricky busi-
ness indeed. One could use a strict liability standard, but it be-
comes quite meaningless under certain circumstances: no one
knows what it means for an automobile to be absolutely crash-
67 See In re A. H. Robins Co., 681 P.2d 540 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). Briefly, the Dalkon
Shield contained a number of serious structural defects. Fins prevented its expulsion or
removal in event of infection, and a tailpiece string (designed to aid in the location of the
device and its removal) served as a host for infection resulting in serious injury to the
mother and fetus, and in some cases death. The cases in essence rested upon the classical
theories of a latent defect in ordinary use, even if one puts aside the elements in the case
(continued marketing after receipt of notice of the serious dangers) that pointed toward
punitive damages. For a detailed account of the Dalkon Shield episode, see Morton Mintz,
At Any Cost: Greed, Women and the Dalkon Shield (1985).
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worthy and to remain an automobile. In other cases, the absolute
liability imposed under the present law induces manufacturers to
withdraw certain products from the market-for example, the per-
tussis vaccine 6S-because they do not think that they can recoup
through the product's price the expected costs of litigation and
liability.69
The search for an appropriate standard thus shifts to the ap-
propriate test for negligence. One test holds that if the risk is
"foreseeable," then the manufacturer may be liable for the failure
to take reasonable care.70 But this formula simply lacks the rele-
vant components of any sound social proposal, for it does not take
into account any explicit measurement of the probability of loss,
the costs of precaution, the availability of substitutes, and other
" See Edmund W. Kitch, Vaccines and Product Liability: A Case of Contagious Litiga-
tion, 9 Regulation 11, 16 (May/June 1985).
Since this article was written Congress has passed the National Childhood Vaccine In-
jury Act of 1986 (see 132 Cong. Rec. H. 11597 (Oct. 17, 1986)), which provides both for a
compensation fund for certain vaccine-induced injuries, and for a revision of the tort rules
of both actual and punitive damages in those cases that remain in the system. The statute is
far too complex to analyze in a short space, but two brief observations are in order. First,
tort liability remains where the manufacturer does not provide "proper" warnings. Compli-
ance with the statutory norms is "presumed" to supply such warnings, unless the plaintiff
shows "by clear and convincing evidence that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care
notwithstanding its compliance" with the applicable statutes and the regulations issued
thereunder. § 2122(b)(1)(B). The standard thus falls short of the conclusive presumption
offered in the text; and the level of actual protection depends critically upon the judicial
interpretation of the statutory standard. Second, the statute prohibits punitive damages
against defendants that have complied with the statutory standards unless the defendant
manufacturer engages in fraud, or intentional and Wrongful withholding of information, or
other illegal conduct, either before the vaccine is approved or after it is in the field. §
2123(d). Again, the meaning of the standard awaits judicial construction.
"' Here note that sales often are made to institutions, not to individual purchasers,
whose budgets may not accommodate the premiums that have to be charged. The usual
paradigm of individual consumer purchasers is thus complicated by the presence of interme-
diate institutions at the original purchase stage. The swine flu case is an obvious illustration
of the failure of insurance markets to work as the proponents of the modern products liabil-
ity law believe they should. My thanks go to Patricia Danzon for stressing this point in
conversation.
70 For cases that have emphasized the importance of foreseeability, either on the ques-
tion of scope of duty or causation, see Barker v. Lull Engineering, 20 Cal.3d 413, 429 n.9,
573 P.2d 443, 452 n.9, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234 n.9 (1978) (design defect in loader); Soler v.
Castmaster, Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 98 N.J. 137, 151-52, 484 A.2d 1225, 1232-33 (1984) (design
defect in altered casting machine design); Rossell v. Volkswagen of America, 147 Ariz. 160,
166-67, 709 P.2d 517, 525-26 (1985) (design defect in placement of battery in 1958 Volk-
swagen); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 135-36, 475 N.E.2d 65,
68 (1985) (omission of "stroke" from warning list of possible complications from use of birth
control pills). In all these cases, the bottom line was the same: notwithstanding the difficul-
ties with duty and causation, liability in the end rested in the hands of the jury, so that
balancing tests replaced categorical standards.
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similarly relevant considerations.
The weaknesses of this program can be corrected by a shift to
a more complex cost-benefit analysis patterned on the Hand
formula and captured in the Wade factors. But this approach sim-
ply substitutes one major problem for another. The information for
determining whether a firm has conducted an optimal research
program cannot be acquired or evaluated accurately. In order to
work, these formulas require that specific numbers be identified
for each of the relevant variables. This empirical information, if
available at all, is available only in the most gross of qualitative
terms. One can easily imagine how erroneously high estimates of
the probability and extent of harm and low estimates of the costs
of prevention could yield uniform determinations of negligence.
Likewise, errors in the opposite direction could lead to uniform ex-
oneration of manufacturers. What good is any test if the possible
outcome is so sensitive to different values of the relevant variables
that any outcome is arguably consistent with the evidence?
I have no strong belief in the matchless ability of administra-
tive agencies to make the correct cost-benefit analysis. In many
cases, I would substitute a regime of private contract for a system
of direct regulation. But if the only question is what form of regu-
lation is best able-or rather, least unable-to control the risk of
dangerous products, administrative agency decisions do have three
major advantages that modern products liability tort law lacks.
First, administrative decisions are not blinded by the mishaps in
individual cases, which, once they occur, tend to obscure the origi-
nal estimates of probability and severity of harm. Second, and
most relevant here, administrative decisions are made at the time
the product is released and can be revised continuously thereafter
on the strength of new data. The system thus can begin to cope
with the acute information deficit otherwise brought on by the pas-
sage of time. Third, recognizing that a determination must be
made at some point, an ex ante determination is cheap in compari-
son with the cost of litigation after the fact, and it will remain so
even if post-release scrutiny is tightened.
Again, note the parallel to problems of title in real estate
cases. The social solution to the adverse possession problem was
not endless refinement in the rules that governed litigation over
title. Rather, it was an end run around the process of case-by-case
litigation through superior conveyancing, surveying, and recording
practices. The use of ex ante procedures is also somewhat like a
demand for writing under the statute of frauds or even for confes-
sion of judgment clauses in loan agreements.
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In sum, for all long-lived products, the proper solution for set-
ting liability relies upon ex ante determinations of the standards
for design and warning, not ex post standard-setting by the jury.
Organizing lawsuits after the fact is often very difficult. The frame-
work for future litigation must be prepared when the product is
released, long before the litigation takes place. Administrative
standards can provide the needed road map in the form of more
categorical rules of litigation, which no common law of adjudica-
tion can match.
F. Outside Statutes of Limitation
The substantive changes in products liability law and the
problems they produce, outlined in the previous section, set the
stage for the special "outside" statutes of limitation (often called
statutes of repose) passed in the last decade by a number of
states. 1' The modern doctrinal developments moved the focus of
litigation backwards in time; the statutes of repose represent an
effort to return it to the present. These statutes are like ordinary
statutes of limitation in that they establish fixed periods in which
suits must be brought. But they differ from the usual statute in
that they do not run from the date of injury, but from the time the
defendant surrenders possession and control of the instrumentality
in question. Accordingly, it may well be that injury will occur after
the period has run. The plaintiff's cause of action therefore could
be barred before it ever accrued.
1. Architects and Constructors. A good illustration of the
pressures leading to these outside statutes is the evolution of New
Jersey law on the liability of architects and contractors. The cases
arise as follows. An architect designs or a contractor builds or re-
furbishes real estate. The work then is completed and turned over
to the owner for general use and occupation, and the original archi-
tect or contractor remains under no ongoing obligation to maintain
or repair the premises. A person injured after turnover to the
owner claims that his losses were caused by the defective design or
workmanship of the original architect or contractor. The question
is whether this cause of action lies or whether the remedy must be
71 See generally Sheila L. Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule
in Products Liability Cases, 13 Forum 279 (1977); Louis N. Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes
of Limitation-A New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 Ins. L. J. 535; Jerry J. Phillips,
An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C. L.
Rev. 663 (1978); Note, The Utah Product Liability Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolu-
tion of Competing Concerns, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 149.
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directed against the party in possession.
Miller v. Davis & Averill7 2 stated the early common law
position:
[T]he general rule is well established that an independent
contractor is not liable for injuries occurring to a third person
after the contractor has completed the work and turned it
over to the owner or employer and it has been accepted by
him, even though the injury results from the contractor's fail-
ure properly to carry out his contract. When the work is fin-
ished by the contractor and accepted by the employer the lat-
ter is substituted as the party responsible for existing
defects. 73
In Miller, this rule barred an action brought by an injured
worker against a contractor who had installed an overhead crane
on a track affixed to the ceiling in the plant where the plaintiff
worked. The crane was either leased or owned (the facts were un-
clear) by the Coca-Cola Company. The track had been delivered
some seven or eight years before the accident, and the defendant
had repaired it two years before the accident. Coca-Cola had main-
tained the equipment thereafter but had not been joined in the
suit, doubtless because it was protected from suit by the exclusive
remedy provision of the workers' compensation statute.
In defending its result, the court held that the intervention by
the owner severed the causal connection with the original wrong
because "'the owner deprives the contractor of all opportunity to
rectify his wrong. The duty of inspection and repairing in such a
case is exclusively upon the owner.' ,,74 MacPherson v. Buick Co.,
which had overturned the privity limitation in products liability
cases generally, was not cited.
Miller was overruled twenty years later in Totten v. Gruzen.75
In Totten, the architect and contractor cases were no longer kept
separate from the cases governing defective chattels, and the gen-
eral rules were seen as creating a jury issue.76 MacPherson was re-
72 137 N.J.L. 671, 61 A.2d 253 (1948). See also the earlier decisions, Smith v. Claude
Neon Lights, Inc., 110 N.J.L. 326, 164 A. 423 (1933); Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, 46 N.J.L. 19
(1884).
73 137 N.J.L. at 674-75, 61 A.2d at 255-56 (citations omitted).
74 Id. at 675, 61 A.2d at 256, quoting Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 110 N.J.L. at
330, 164 A. at 425.
7- 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968). The date fits well with the 1968 division suggested
earlier in note 56 and accompanying text.
76 The case most heavily relied upon was Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965), which extended strict products liability rules to developers of mass
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garded as the decisive authority on privity, while the proximate
cause argument in Miller, that "the contractor is deprived of all
opportunity to rectify his wrong, the owner being thereupon sub-
stituted as the party responsible for existing defects," was rejected
as an "unrealistic theory. 77 Having passed over this initial hurdle,
the New Jersey Supreme Court quickly leaped over a second by
noting that the distinction between patent and latent defects no
longer had an absolute character sufficient to sever causal
connection:
[T]he dichotomy appears to rest on the notion that if the de-
sign or workmanship is so obviously bad and dangerous, the
owner would or should do something promptly to correct it
and, if he does not, liability for injury rests with him alone.
The idea is somewhat strange and illogical in thus terminating
the possibility of liability of the party basically at fault. Per-
haps it would be sounder to say that the subsequent inaction
of the owner simply adds him as another possible tortfeasor.78
With these last two sentences, the court demotes the wrong of
the current owner from the sole to a concurrent cause, thereby al-
lowing an action to proceed against the remote contractor and sup-
plier. It is far from clear, however, why the prior rule of liability
should be abandoned as illogical. The prior rule barring the remote
action shortens the time frame, eliminates the possibility of an er-
roneous verdict against a remote party, and fastens incentives for
precaution on the part of the party in possession, where those in-
centives are most likely to be effective. Neither the original archi-
tect nor the contractor could force his way into possession, and it
is not obvious that the present owner will allow them access to cor-
rect the defect even if they could discover it at a distance. There
may also be a dispute as to whether the defect exists, whether it
needs correction, and if so, what that correction might be. The
owner of the premises may demand compensation at the outset for
the time and profits lost because of the time his plant is down for
repairs, or he may insist upon such compensation in the event that
something goes wrong.
The modern rule of divided responsibility thus creates a com-
housing. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) was not
cited, probably because it dealt with the question of implied warranties of sale, and with the
legality of contracting out, neither of which were issues in Totten.
7 52 N.J. at 208, 245 A.2d at 4.
7. 52 N.J. at 211, 245 A.2d at 6.
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plex bargaining situation with considerable opportunity for confu-
sion, even if the owner in possession does not seek to extract some
collateral gain by holding out against the architect or contractor.
The clean rule of Miller has obvious advantages that the Totten
decision never confronts.
The story does not end there, however. Totten proved to be
unstable because of the enormous and ongoing liability exposure it
created for architects and contractors. With common law develop-
ments foreclosed, the pressure built for a statutory response. It
came in the form of an outside statute of limitation. By its terms,
the statute barred any suit against the parties who originally
designed or constructed improvements beyond ten years after they
turned it over to the party in possession of the property, be it as
owner or tenant.
79
In effect, this outside statute reinstitutes a fraction of the
older proximate cause rule of Miller. The logic behind the statute
is that the problems dealt with by the Miller rule did not disap-
pear with the abrogation of its proximate cause limitation. The
outside statute therefore shortens the time frame, reduces the level
of error, reduces the need to examine the conduct of intermediate
parties, and clarifies the incentives upon the party in possession. It
is a close question whether the ten-year statute is as good as the
original (and more restrictive) proximate cause rule, but both rules
seem superior to the open-ended joint causation rule of Totten.
In due course, this statute was subject to constitutional chal-
lenge, which the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected in Rosenberg
v. Town of North Bergen.80 The court rebuffed the plaintiff's argu-
ment as follows:
[P]laintiff's alleged cause of action did not arise until she fell
7' The full text reads as follows:
No action whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any defi-
ciency in the design, planning, supervision or construction of an improvement to real
property, or for any injury to property, real or personal, or for an injury to the person,
or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition
of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought against any person per-
forming or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction
of such improvement to real property, more than 10 years after the performance or
furnishing of such services and construction. This limitation shall not apply to any
person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the improve-
ment at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes
the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which the action is brought.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1.1 (West 1952).
80 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
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and sustained injury. Of course this was many years after the
ten-year period fixed by the statute had expired. She claims
that the statute, in its application to her, amounts to a depri-
vation of due process, since, as she expresses it, the statute
bars her cause of action before it has arisen. This formulation
suggests a misconception of the effect of the statute. It does
not bar a cause of action; its effect, rather, is to prevent what
might otherwise be a cause of action, from ever arising. Thus
injury occurring more than ten years after the negligent act
allegedly responsible for the harm, forms no basis for recov-
ery. The injured party literally has no cause of action. The
harm that has been done is damnum absque injuria-a wrong
for which the law affords no redress. The function of the stat-
ute is thus rather to define substantive rights than to alter or
modify a remedy. The Legislature is entirely at liberty to cre-
ate new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right is
disturbed.8'
The response of the court is odd and evasive, but this is not to
say that the result is wrong. Of course, it is wholly a matter of
words to say that the cause of action was barred before it accrued
or to say that it never existed at all. Whether the statute should
stand or fall should depend upon its substance, not upon an arbi-
trary judicial verbalization.
Admittedly also, the court's total deference to the legislative
action is unjustified. I reject the now-popular view that the legisla-
ture has complete power to alter general rules of conduct. General
rules are essential in defining the existence of property rights in
the first instance.8 2 There would be no coherent conception of pri-
vate property if the general law of trespass to land were totally
abolished, even prospectively. Altering rights of action is serious
business because it necessarily alters the underlying property and
personal rights that the rights of action protect.
However, even a more stringent standard of judicial review
does not doom this outside statute to constitutional invalidation,
'whether the due process analysis is substantive (as an alteration of
81 61 N.J. at 199-200, 293 A.2d at 667 (citations omitted).
82 I have addressed these issues in Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain chs. 8, 16 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitaliza-
tion of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 711-12 (1984). Note that the New Jersey
court's distinction between "defining" substantive rights and "altering or modifying" a re-
medial provision parallels the unsatisfactory use of that distinction in the contracts clause
cases. See 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 746.
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a property right) or procedural (as a limit on a right of action).
The control of error in adjudication is one of the primary objec-
tives of any legal system. As the arguments above suggest, the
modern common law rules generate high error rates and are very
costly to administer. A solution that eliminates a right of action
against a remote party while preserving an action against the im-
mediate party is the best way to reduce the costs associated with
the passage of time.
It is easy to see how the reduction in these costs creates gains
for owners and contractors. Once the liability rules are fixed and
definite, the original owner can reduce the purchase price and fees
otherwise payable to the architect and contractor to reflect the ad-
ditional costs (of repairs and of prospective liability) that the
owner now has to bear. Therefore, the critical question is whether
the outside statute improves the position of the injured party.
Here the matter is more doubtful because of the risk that the
owner (now the only potential target) will be insolvent. Yet that
problem exists in the many cases where, under all conceivable the-
ories, the owner alone is responsible for defective maintenance and
repair. The problem should be and usually is countered with a sys-
tem of occupier liability, mandatory premises insurance, or direct
government inspection of dangerous premises.
In any event, one should not condemn the outside statute on
constitutional grounds simply because it is not immediately obvi-
ous that it will leave victims better off. On matters of error control,
it is very difficult to demand of any given rule that it leave every-
one better off than its alternative. Often the only possible choice is
between a rule with too many cases of undeserved liability and one
with too many cases of undeserved escapes from liability. Either
way, any rule generates systematic and uncompensated losses. The
best one can ask for is a long term consistent movement toward
error minimization in all contexts, and this the outside statute pro-
vides. Under an aggregate utilitarian approach, this result is ut-
terly unproblematic; while if one demands a Pareto justification,
the statute probably moves the legal system closer to some Pareto
ideal (even if it will not achieve it), since both the benefits and
burdens of these remedial statutes are widely dispersed."
83 Under my own system the question here requires a balancing of two types of error,
overinclusion and underinclusion. On this determination, some degree of deference has to be
shown to the legislature, for the most that can be asked is that the statute in question tries
reasonably to minimize the sum of the two types of errors. That goal may be served best by
imposing no liability on some defendants. For more extended development, see Epstein,
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The case for the statute can be put more forcefully. To hold
this outside statute of limitation unconstitutional necessarily con-
demns on constitutional grounds the earlier common law rules of
privity and the rule of proximate cause under Miller. Both these
common law rules were more restrictive of the plaintiff's rights of
recovery than is the new statute. If the statute is unconstitutional,
then the prior common law rules of causation and privity are un-
constitutional as well, notwithstanding their wide traditional ac-
ceptance and their strong efficiency justifications.8 4
2. Products Liability. The qualified nature of the constitu-
tional approval given in Rosenberg is illustrated by the subsequent
reaction to more recent statutes of limitation passed in response to
the changes in general products liability law. The basic pattern of
these statutes is to create an outside period of ten to twelve years
from the date of sale, after which no action may be brought against
the original manufacturer. Suits against all other parties in posses-
sion remain unaffected by the statutes, which are designed to
shorten the interval between the operative facts and the date of
suit. As was the case with real estate recording statutes, steps also
had to be taken to ensure that these statutes of repose could not
be circumvented by allowing the party in possession, once sued, to
pursue the original manufacturer with claims for contribution and
indemnity. In addition, there were serious questions as to whether
the outside period of limitation should bar only actions attributa-
ble to negligence, or, more problematically, should extend to bar
actions arising from willful and deliberate concealment of known
product defects; and finally, whether the outside limit should ap-
ply at all to certain kinds of products, prescription drugs in
particular.
Takings at 126-29 (cited in note 82). Note that it is not certain that the improvement in
incentives and judicial administration will provide sufficient net benefit ex ante to the par-
ticular parties whose actions for tort it might compromise. Yet that is necessarily the case
with respect to any statute designed to control error in litigation, including the ordinary
statute of limitation.
" See Epstein, Takings at 238-41 (cited in note 82), where I argue that most common
law rules of general application are constitutional, even when a modification of these rules
(for example, the shift from strict liability to negligence) raises in principle serious constitu-
tional issues.
One further defense of the privity rule is that it offers the best approximation of the
contract that all three persons would have reached if, with knowledge of the future difficul-
ties, they could have contracted costlessly at the outset of their relationships. For further
discussion, see Stephen E. Margolis, Two Definitions of Efficiency in Law and Economics,
16 J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 1987); Epstein, 16 Ga. L. Rev. at 775 (cited in note 52). It
surely must be remembered that so many problems of modern liability law arise because
explicit contracts are rejected even where they have obtained consumer acceptance.
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In my view, the hard line on the outside limitation seems to be
appropriate to most of the disputed situations. The question again
is how to minimize the sum of the relevant error costs in both di-
rections. The costs created by the statute arise in cases where re-
covery should be allowed because the harms are attributable to la-
tent defects that cause harm in ordinary use. However, the analysis
in such cases is not uniform with respect to all products, and not
all actions against manufacturers will fall within the statute's bar.
Consider, for example, capital equipment: as a matter of course,
almost all capital equipment whose life exceeds ten years will be
inspected, repaired, and maintained in the interim. In some cases
(as is often so with airplanes and their components) the manufac-
turer retains a continuous service obligation over the product, in
which case liability commonly could attach to a breach of that
duty.
In other cases, where the control over the product has ceased,
the only liability possible is for original defects; but that liability
nevertheless should cease after a fixed time, as others further down
the chain have superior control over the product and thus are more
appropriate defendants. With asbestos the employer controls the
workplace environment and the product use. With drugs and ge-
neric products, there often is similar intervening supervision as
well, usually by physicians or public health officials. The most dif-
ficult cases by far are the drug cases with delayed manifestation of
injury. In those cases, there is no intermediate party who stands
responsible for subsequent harms. Nonetheless, the inherent diffi-
culties presented by the passage of time, as demonstrated in the
DES and Agent Orange cases, suggest that the presumptive ten- or
twelve-year period makes good sense in these cases as well.85 Al-
though my conclusion here is a cautious one, the probability of
identifying a sound basis for recovery against the original supplier
seems sufficiently small in these cases to justify banning the action
altogether-at least after some period of time.
Similarly, there appears to be little reason to exempt negli-
gence actions from the operation of the statutes as regards either
capital equipment or generic products.81 If negligence-based causes
16 I discuss these cases in some detail in Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance
Dynamics of Mass Torts, 13 J. Legal Stud. 475, 479-505 (1984).
" See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (West 1982), which calls for a twelve-year
period but exempts actions based upon negligence. The statute also exempts actions based
upon breach of express warranty. There is no reason not to enforce voluntary undertakings,
but there is a risk that some vague affirmation will be confused with a written warranty,
which often has explicit time protections.
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are not excluded, the statute may have little practical effect. As
courts and commentators repeatedly have noted, it often is very
difficult to find a principled difference between theories of negli-
gence and theories of strict liability, especially in modern warning
and design cases.8 7
In other cases, it is true, the line between negligence and strict
liability is tolerably clear because the strict liability test dispenses
with the cost-benefit calculation that the negligence formula makes
obligatory. Yet given the network of contracts that link producer
and consumer, simple tests of physical causation cannot establish
prima facie liability in products cases. Instead, the operative dis-
tinction between strict liability and negligence is, verbally, the line
between a defendant's producing an unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct and a defendant's using less than reasonable care in producing
an unreasonably dangerous product. Some case-by-case cost-bene-
fit analysis, with its substantial temporal component, must be un-
dertaken under both these standards of liability. The line between
negligence and strict liability in products cases therefore becomes
sufficiently evanescent that no outside statute of limitation could
have much bite if it barred only strict liability actions. The point
of outside statutes is to ban actions that should not be brought; it
is not to encourage deft pleading by skilled plaintiff's lawyers de-
termined to make an end run around the ban.
The more difficult question is what to do with the cases of
deliberate harm of the sort that would support sound claims for
punitive damages. One solution would be to maintain the absolute
ban, following the original design of the New Jersey architect's and
contractor's statute. One could argue in favor of the absolute ban
that it is not likely that manufacturers ever will engage in system-
atic harmful conduct in reliance upon statutory protection that
kicks in only ten or twelve years after the product is marketed.
The future benefits of the .statute have to be discounted to their
present value, which is small in comparison to the very substantial
tort, criminal, and regulatory sanctions that remain in the long pe-
riod after the initial sale of the product and before the imposition
of the ban. It is very difficult to design a product that does harm
only after the expiration of the statutory period. Even if the manu-
facturer has direct protection under the statute, he still might be
forced to sign contracts of indemnity or contribution to protect his
immediate purchasers, who as parties in possession of dangerous
17 See, e.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974)
(discussing the difficulty of setting an ex post standard for crashworthiness).
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instrumentalities will not fall within the ambit of any outside stat-
ute. Alternatively, where the contractual obligation is not made ex-
plicit, the immediate buyer will have a greater incentive to inspect
the product before placing it in use, which in turn will redound to
the benefit of the ultimate user. Therefore, the statute still main-
tains substantial incentives for product safety.
Still another argument in favor of the absolute ban rests on
the risk that a series of judicial decisions will expand the class of
"deliberate harms" by degrees until it swallows the original rule.
Already the line between accidental and deliberate harms has
proven sufficiently pliable in, for example, the context of punitive
damages, where today a showing that a manufacturer had some no-
tice of a possible product defect is potentially sufficient to trigger
an inquiry into punitive damages.8 Likewise, the experience with
qualified privileges in the law of official immunity shows how diffi-
cult it is to keep the door open just a crack.8 9 Flexibility in these
cases, therefore, may be not a virtue, but a vice.
However, it is important not to press this argument for the
outside ban too far. A manufacturer may be more able to take stra-
tegic advantage of the absolute bar where the harms from the dan-
gerous substance (chemical, drug, or natural substance) show up
only years after ingestion-as for example with asbestos. In these
circumstances, the length and regularity of the latency period
make it quite possible that all such cases will arise after the period
has run, so that a manufacturer could reap substantial benefits
from deliberate suppression of relevant information. Thus the case
"s See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1982);
Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Mo. App. 1978). In addition, see Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 734-35 (Minn. 1980) (compliance with statutory
standards held not to preclude punitive damages). For a general critique of punitive dam-
ages, see David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers
of Defective Products, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1982), in which Professor Owen takes a dimmer
view of punitive damage awards than he has previously. Contrast David G. Owen, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1361-71 (1976).
"' For the progression, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), reh'g denied, 361 U.S.
855 (1960) (providing for an absolute immunity against common law torts for officials acting
within the outer perimeter of their official duties); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)
(creating a qualified immunity for official actions undertaken "reasonably and in good faith"
by cabinet officials, in cases of constitutional wrongs); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982) (narrowing the scope of that immunity by emphasizing the "objective" elements);
Fitzgerald v. Nixon, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (conferring an absolute immunity on the Presi-
dent). It is also interesting to note that nowhere in the modern case law development has it
been seriously suggested that any qualified immunity, once granted, should be overridden
by a simple showing of negligence. That same line of reasoning applies to the protection
afforded by outside statutes of limitations.
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for the absolute ban is far weaker in these instances of latent de-
fect and cumulative trauma.
The ideal solution in such cases is hard to come by, but per-
haps some mixed approach may be tried. For latent injury cases,
the protection of an outside statute of limitation probably should
not be absolute: proof of deliberate concealment should revive the
cause of action. On the other hand, for ordinary equipment and
capital goods the outside statute should remain; but an extended
period could be provided for actions based on deliberate harm. Yet
at some point, the cost of adjudication becomes so large that an
absolute cutoff becomes preferable even for deliberate harms. A
possible compromise would leave the ten-year period for accidental
harms and adopt a longer period, perhaps twenty years, for delib-
erate harms.90 There clearly is room for much disagreement over
the ideal provisions of an outside statute.
The substantive changes in products liability have created
substantial pressures to adopt these outside statutes of limitation
as a safe harbor from the open-ended principles of liability that
have developed at common law. Nonetheless, the second genera-
tion of statutes has fared far worse in the courts than did the ar-
chitect and contractor statute sustained in Rosenberg. The deci-
sion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.91 is typical of the substantial minority of states that
have struck down outside statutes of limitations in products cases.
In essence, the New Hampshire statute required that, subject to
certain exceptions not relevant here, a products liability action be
brought not "later than 12 years after the manufacturer of the fi-
nal product parted with its possession and control or sold it, which
ever occurred last."92 The court struck down the statute on the
ground that it arbitrarily barred a cause of action before it ac-
crued. The court also condemned the statute as "unreasonable be-
cause the mere purchase of pills produced by a drug manufacturer
so The result is similar to that which is appropriate in the adverse possession cases.
There, a two-tiered statute has a shorter limitation period for innocent adverse possessors
(those who think that they have good title papers) and a second longer limitation period for
bad faith possessors who knew that their claims originated in their own trespasses. See Ep-
stein, 64 Wash. U. L. Q. at 662 (cited in note 15).
91 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983). The New Hampshire court cited a number of
other cases that reached the same general conclusion. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long &
Hagerty, 416 So.2d 996 (Ala. 1982) (ten-year statute void under Ala. Const. art. I, § 13);
Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980) (twelve-year statute void
under Fla. Const. art. I., § 21), overruled by Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So.2d 657 (Fla.
1985).
92 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:2, 11(a) (1979).
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in California, or of a defective automobile in Michigan, does not
place the consumer on notice of a hidden defect injurious to his
health or safety."93 It then quoted a passage from the dissenting
opinion of Judge Frank in Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co. to
clinch its constitutional condemnation:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are con-
ceived, or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop
never planted, or burn down a house never built, or miss a
train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially
similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a
sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations does not be-
gin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action
exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the
plaintiff.9 4
I confess to some awkwardness in criticizing Heath, for I
helped draft the original version of the New Hampshire statute in
my capacity as a consultant to the American Insurance Associa-
tion. But like the architect and contractor statutes in Rosenberg,
this particular statute of limitation need not be defended in the
constitutional arena solely on the ground that legislatures have
plenary powers to regulate causes of action in the courts. The pas-
sage by Judge Frank shows, if anything, how perilous it is to move
from propositions about natural truths to conclusions about sound
legal policies. It is in the physical nature of things that birth pre-
cede death and planting precede harvest. Yet there is no necessary
axiom that limitation periods must run only from the time of in-
jury. To be sure, that rule makes good sense as a first approxima-
tion; were the basic rule to be otherwise, there could be no legal
system at all, as all lawsuits would be barred before they were cre-
ated. But the question still remains: is it possible to work some
Pareto improvement by a principled deviation from the default
rule that statutes of limitation are keyed to the accrual of a cause
of action?
The advantages of the outside period already have been noted.
It reduces both administrative and error costs of litigation. It pro-
vides a corrective against the general doctrinal tendencies of prod-
93 464 A.2d at 295. Note the implicit appeal to the "latent defect causing harm in ordi-
nary use" formula as an attack on the statute. There would be no need for the outside
statute if the basic common law doctrines had confined tort liability of remote manufactur-
ers in this fashion.
94 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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ucts liability law, tendencies that have removed all internal doctri-
nal barriers to suits based on ancient evidence and have precluded
contractual allocation of the risk of liability for personal injury. It
strengthens the incentives for care on the party in possession. Ex
ante these gains seem to be substantial. On the merits, I believe
that the legal system operates better with the statute than without
it. This point, however, surely is open to debate, given the empiri-
cal estimates on which it necessarily rests. Yet as a constitutional
matter, it seems wholly improbable that this estimate is so wildly
incorrect that it should be struck down by a court that itself never
examined any of the possible arguments that could be made in
favor of the statute.
It is an ironic measure of the temper of the times that Judge
Frank's account of a topsy-turvy world came in dissent in a case
involving a statute that provided that a cause of action should ac-
crue within one year of "the act or omission complained of." 95 In
that case, the defendant sold a rifle to a third party three years
before the date on which its use resulted in injury. At no point did
anyone challenge the constitutionality of this unfortunate statute.
The court simply treated the matter as an exercise in statutory
construction and dismissed the hapless plaintiff by noting that the
date of the last act or omission is not the date of injury. One could
easily strike down the statute in Dincher on constitutional
grounds, precisely because it introduces the very error costs con-
trolled by the ten-year outside period.
CONCLUSION
The critical point, on which this article closes, is that an un-
derstanding of the statute of limitation requires an understanding
of the frictions of the legal system to which it responds. That re-
sponse cannot proceed on the basis of any self-evident axiom that
ignores the relevant costs and benefits of alternative institutional
arrangements. The discussion thus leads back to the point from
which this journey began. The detailed features of any successful
working system of tort law must beware of the enormous practical
frictions that have the power to undermine any substantive sys-
tem, however noble. It is a lesson that courts tend to forget today
in fashioning the common law and constitutional responses to the
temporal dimension in tort litigation.
" Conn. Gen. Stat. § 91 (1949), amended in 1957.
1218
